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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
FEDERAL POWER OVER COMMERCE, 1910-1914. 11.
By THOMAS REED POWELL*
I C0MMERCE AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES

(Concluded)

T

HE decisions reviewed in the two preceding installments' have had to do with questions raised by congressional legislation confined to interstate carriers. There remain
for consideration the decisions from 1910 to 1914 on constitutional
issues raised by exercises or asserted exercises of the commerce
power not confined in their application to persons or corporations
directly engaged in interstate transportation. The cases to be
reviewed in this paper deal with regulations of the persons or
things transported rather than with the agencies transporting them.
Sellers of goods to be transported across state lines may come within the regulatory power of Congress though they hire others to do
the transporting. Passengers on interstate journeys are subject
to a degree of congressional control by virtue of the commerce
power. So, too, persons who hinder interstate commerce may run
afoul of congressional enactments in favor of the freedom of such
commerce.
7. HEIGHT OF BRIDGES ACT
The constitutionality of the act of Congress authorizing the
secretary of war to require the alteration of bridges which after
a hearing he determines to be unreasonable obstructions to the
interstate commerce on the stream below was reaffirmed in Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States.' Mr. Justice Harlan declared:
"The court has heretofore held, upon full consideration, that
Congress had full authority, under the constitution, to enact section 18 of the act of March 3d, 1899, and that the delegation to
the secretary of war specified in that section was not a departure
from the established constitutional rule that forbids the delegation
of strictly legislative or judicial powers to an executive officer of
the government. All that the act did was to impose upon the secretary the duty of attending to such details as were necessary in
*Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University.
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U. S. 194, 55 L. Ed. 699, 31 S. C. R. 6o3.
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order to carry out the declared policy of the government as to the
free and unobstructed navigation of those waters of the United
States over which Congress, in virtue of its power to regulate commerce, had paramount control. It is also firmly settled that such
alterations of bridges over the navigable waters of the United
States as the chief of engineers recommended, and as the secretary of war required to be made after notice and hearing the
parties interested, was not a taking of the property of the owners
of such bridges, within the meaning of the constitution."2
Complaints that the secretary of war had not followed the
procedure set forth in the statute were held to be unfounded.
Since the statute of Congress under which the bridge was originally authorized expressly reserved the right to alter or amend it
so as to require the removal of material obstructions to the navigation of the river which the bridge spans, the complainant was
held to have no basis for the contention that it was not within the
rulings of prior cases.
In United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.' an order of the
secretary of war to alter a certain bridge was held invalid because
2Ibid., 205. In Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, (1912) 223 U. S. 605, 56
L. Ed. 570, 32 S. C. R., 340, which denied to riparian owners any right to
restrain the secretary of war from fixing the high-water mark of navigable rivers at a point different from that previously established by the
state, Mr. Justice Hughes observed at pages 634-635:
"'The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that
purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the
United States which are accessible from a state other than those in which
they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and
subject to all the requisite legislation by Congress. This necessarily includes the power to keep them open and free from any obstructions to
their navigation, interposed by the states or otherwise; to remove such
obstructions when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as they
may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil and for the punishment of offenders. For these purposes Congress possesses all the powers
which existed in the states before the adoption of the national constitution, and which have always existed in the Parliament in England.' Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, 725.
"Nor is this authority of Congress limited to so .much of the water of
the river as flows over the bed of forty years ago. The alterations produced in the course of years by the action of the water do not restrict the
exercise of federal control in the regulation of commerce. Its bed may
vary and its banks may change, but the federal power remains paramount
over the stream, and this control may not be defeated by the action of
the state in restricting the public right of navigation within the river's
ancient lines. The public right of navigation follows the stream ... and
the authority of Congress goes with it....
"It is for Congress to decide what shall or shall not be deemed in
judgment of law an obstruction of navigation.... And in its regulation
of commerce it may establish harbor lines or limits beyond which deposits shall not be made or structures built in the navigable waters."
2(1913) 229 U. S. 244, 57 L. Ed. ii69, 33 S. C. R. 85o.
Mr. Justice
Pitney did not sit.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

of a prior judgment that the bridge in question was not within the
act of Congress. This prior judgment had not been appealed to the
Supreme Court, so that the decision of the circuit court of appeals
which was held controlling because of the doctrine of res adjudicata was not one that necessarily would be affirmed by the Supreme
Court in proper proceedings. The act of 1862 under which the
particular bridge was authorized, unlike succeeding statutes dealing with such matters, tontained no express reservation of any
right to alter or amend it in any respect. The circuit court of appeals had held that the erection of the bridge under such authorization "created a vested right in the use of the bridge of which
the defendants could not be deprived without just compensation."
The Supreme Court in the present proceeding declared that:
"how far, if at all, the grant of the right to build the bridge under
the terms specified in the act of 1862, with no reservation )f the
right to alter or amend, will operate to limit the power of Congress
to directly legislate on the subject of the removal or alteration of
the bridge, is a question we are not here concerned with, and there
fore express no opinion Upon it."
8. FOOD AND DRUGS ACT
By the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, Congress forbade the interstate transportation of adulterated or misbranded
articles of food or drugs. One of the enforcement provisions of
the act authorized the seizure and confiscation of articles being
transported in violation of the statute or which after transportation remain unloaded, unsold, or in original unbroken packages.
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States' presented the question of the
validity of the seizure of eggs in the state of destination in the
possession of a bakery concern which proposed to use them in making other food products. They were still in the original package,
and the bakery concern had purchased them in their state of origin
and was both shipper and consignee. A contention that the statute
does not apply to articles shipped not for sale but for use in making other articles was denied by the court. A further contention
that the articles may not be seized under federal authority after
their interstate transportation has ended was held equally unfounded. As put by Mr. Justice McKenna, "the contention attempts to apply to articles of illegitimate commerce the rule which
marks the line between the exercise of federal power and state
"(1911) 220 U. S. 45, 55 L. Ed. 364, 31 S. C. R. 364. A case on the same
point in another court is considered in 24 Harv. L. Rev. 235.
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power over articles of legitimate commerce." This seems to concede to the complainant more than it deserved, for goods in the
original packages in which they have come* from other states are
not as a rule subject to state police power prior to the first sale,
though they are subject to the general taxing power. If
these eggs had been intoxicating liquor, the state could not have
prohibited their sale in the days before Congress legislated so as
to allow state laws to apply. State police laws could apply to articles of extra-state origin still in the hands of the consignee in the
original package only to prevent fraud or to guard against deleterious substances. It is true, however, that in the absence of
congressional action, these adulterated eggs could hive been dealt
with to a certain extent by the state, but it would be"because of
an illegitimate, rather than because of a legitimate, character. Mr.
Justice McKenna answers the constitutional complaint as follows:
"The contention misses the question in the case. There is here
no conflict of national and state jurisdictions over property legally articles of trade. The question here is whether articles which
are outlaws of commerce may be seized wherever found; and it
certainly will not be contended that they are outside of the jurisdiction of the national government when they are within the borders
of the state. The question in the case, therefore, is, What power
has Congress over such articles? Can ihey escape the consequences
of their illegal transportation by being mingled at the place of destination With other property? To give them such immunity would
defeat, in many cases, the provision for their confiscation, and
their confiscation or destruction is the especial concern of the law.
The power to do so is certainly appropriate to the right to bar them
from interstate commerce, and completes its purpose, which is not
to prevent merely the physical movement of adulterated articles,
but the use of them, or rather to prevent trade in them between
the states by denying to them the facilities of interstate commerce.
And appropriate means to that end, which we have seen is legitimate, are the seizure and condemnation of their articles at their
point of destination in the original, unbroken packages. The selection of such means is certainly within that breadth of discretion which we have said Congress possesses in the execution of
the powers conferred upon it by the constitution."'
The power of Congress was extended still further in McDermott v. Wisconsin,' in which it was held that the federal act had
constitutionally dictated that the labels approved by' federal authorities for goods shipped in interstate commerce should be on the
immediate container of the article intended for consumption and
5

(1g91)

22o U. S. 45, 58, 55 L. Ed. 364, 31 S. C. R. 364.
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not merely on the outside case in which such containers were sent
across state lines. The precise point of the case is that a state may
not forbid, even after the original package is broken, the retention on the immediate container of the labels which are lawful under federal authority. This decision necessarily involves sanction of
the power of Congress to prescribe the labels on immediate containers and to authorize or command their retention after these immediate containers have been removed from the original packages in
which they arrived in the state of destination and until they have
been sold. The opinion seems to go further and to extend to Congress the constitutional power to seize the containers after they
have been removed from the original package. It is pointed out by
Mr. Justice Day that the retention of the federal labels on the unsold containers after removal from the original package is essential
to proof whether the act of Congress has been violated or not. It is
"the means of vindication or the basis of punishment in determining the character of the interstate shipment dealt with by Congress." Section 10 of the federal act provides for seizure of any
adulterated or misbranded article which, after having been transported in interstate commerce, "remains unloaded, unsold, or in
original broken packages."
The court holds that unsold articles
not in the original packages may be seized under the act and under
the constitution. Mr. Justice Day says that "when section 2 has
been violated, the federal authority, in enforcing either section 2
or section 10, may follow the adulterated or misbranded article at
least to the shelf of the importer."
To this he adds:
"To make the provisions of the act effectual, Congress has provided not only for the seizure of the goods while being actually
transported in interstate commerce, but also has provided for such
seizure after such transportation and while the goods remain 'unloaded, unsold, or in original broken packages.' The opportunity
for inspection en route may be very inadequate. The real opportunity of government inspection may only arise, when, as in the
present case, the goods as packed have been removed from the outside box in which they were shipped, and remain, as the act provides, 'unsold.' It is enough, by the terms of the act, if the
goods are unsold, whether in original packages or not. Bearing
in mind the authority of Congress to make effectual regulations to
keep impure or misbranded articles out of.the channels of interstate
commerce, we think the provisions of section 10 are clearly within
'(1913) 228 U. S. 115, 57 L. Ed. 754, 33 S. C. R. 431. See 26 Harv. L.
Rev. 757, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 67, and 19 Va. L. Reg. 148.
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its power. Indeed it seems evident that they are measures essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of the act."
9. ExCLUSION OF SPONGES ACT

A question of federal power over interstate commerce was
apparently dealt with in The Abby Dodge' which sustained as to
foreign commerce an act of Congress prohibiting the introduction
into the United States of sponges gathered by diving or diving
apparatus from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico or Straits of
Florida. The indictment failed to specify the place from which
the sponges in question were taken. As they were landed in Florida, it would appear that, had they been derived from the territorial waters of Florida, the only transportation was intra-state.
Chief Justice White, however, declares broadly that "the statute
is repugnant to the constitution when applied to sponges taken or
gathered within state territorial limits," and does not restrict his
statement to the landing of the sponges in the same state in which
they originate. The cases adduced in support of the lack of congressional power are those sustaining state power over the taking
'(1913) 228 U. S. 115, 136. In United States v. Johnson, (i92i) 221
U. S. 488, 55 L. Ed. 823, 3I S. C. R. 627, false and misleading statements as
to the curative qualities of a proprietary medicine were held not to be
"misbrandings" within the meaning of that term in the federal Food and
Drugs Act, where such statements purport to convey no information as
to the identity of the substances in the compound. Mr. Justice Hughes,
in dissenting, conceded that the act forbade only false statements of fact
and not mere expressions of opinion, but he thought that the concededly
worthless character of the medicine in question made the statemefnts as
to its power to cure cancer false statements of fact and so within the prohibition of the act. Justices Harlan and Day concurred in the dissent.
United States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co., (914) 231 U. S. 654, 58 L.
Ed. 419, 34 S. C. R. 222, held that the requirement of the act that labels
of drugs shall contain the quantity or proportion of certain substances or
derivatives of such substances means that the statement of the derivatives
shall include a statement of the primary substances and that regulations
specifically requiring this are therefore authorized by the act. The labels
held unlawful stated the quantity of acetphenetidin and added that the
drug contained no acetanilid. The former is a derivative of the latter.
Savage v. Jones, (1912) 225 U. S. 5oi, 56 L. Ed. 1182, 32 S. C. R. 715,
and Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, (1912) 225 U. S. 540, 56 L. Ed.
1197, 32 S. C. R. 784, held that the federal Food and Drugs Act of i9o6
forbade only misbranding or adulteration and did not require a statement
of the ingredients of food and drugs shipped in interstate commerce, and
therefore left the states free to impose the latter requirement on goods
of extra-state origin still in the original package.
The Pure Food Act and the White Slave Act are discussed in William
C. Woodward, "The Exercise of Federal Authority Over Interstate Commerce As a Police Power," i Georgetown L. J. 23. An administrative
interpretation of the Pure Food Act with respect fo sausage is dealt with
in 23 Yale L. J. 182.
'(1912) 223 U. S. i66, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 S. C. R. 3io.
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of fish and oysters within the territorial limits of the state. This
makes possible the inference that the chief justice regards the
statute as a regulation of the taking of the sponges, as later a
majority of the court regarded the law forbidding the interstate
transportation of products made by child labor as a regulation of
manufacture.' Yet, since the indictment involved sponges landed in Florida and there is no hint that the territorial waters from
which the sponges might have come were other than those of Florida, the chief justice may be having in mind a case in which there
is no interstate transportation. It will portray, if not settle
the doubt as to the scope of his declarations to quote the following
excerpts:
"Broadly, the act, it is insisted, is repugnant to the constitution because, in one aspect, it deals with a matter exclusively
within the authority of the states.... [This] proceeds upon the
assumption that the act regulates the taking or gathering of sponges attached to the land under water, within the territorial limits of
the state of Florida, and it may he of other states bordering on
the Gulf of Mexico, prohibits internal commerce in sponges so
taken or gathered, and is therefore plainly an unauthorized exercise of power by Congress ....
If the premise upon which . . . [this] rests be correct, that is

to say, the assumption that the act, when rightly construed, applies
to sponges taken or gathered from land under water within the
territorial limits of the state of Florida or other states, the repugnancy of the act to the constitution would plainly be established
by the decisions of this court."'"
Here, as elsewhere in the opinion, the chief justice is talking about
the scope of the statute, and not about the particular state of facts
before the court. It is in order to avoid repugnance of the statute
to the constitution that he restricts it to delivery of sponges not
taken from the territorial waters of any state. This restriction of
the statute would of course make it inapplicable to sponges brought
to New York from Florida waters. Such a restriction necessarily
goes beyond the requirements of the particular case and is therefore obiter dictum. Justices McKenna and Holmes certainly
could not have intended to approve of the broad implications possible from the chief justice's statements, since they later dissented in the Child Labor Case.
'Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. Ed. 11Ol, 38 S. C.
R. 529. Prior to the enactment of the child labor law, the power of Congress was considered in Jasper Yeates Brinton, "The Constitutionality of
a Federal Child Labor Law," 62 U. Pa. L. Rev. 487; and in William
Draper Lewis, "The Federal Power to Regulate Child Labor in the Light
of Supreme Court Decisions," 62 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504.
"°(1912) 223 U. S. 166, 173, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 S.C. R. 310.
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10. THE WILSON ACT

The act of August 8, 1890, provided that intoxicating liquor
shipped into any state or territory should upon .arrival therein
be subject to the laws of such state or territory, enacted in the exercise of its police powers, as though such liquor had been produced therein. The constitutionality of the law was sustained in the
year following its enactment. Two cases during the period now
under review interpret the scope of the statute. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. F. W. Cook Brewing Co.' followed an earlier
decision in holding that the words "upon arrival therein" mean arrival at their destination in the possession of the consignee and not
arrival within the borders of the state. De Bary v. Louisiana"
held that the congressional act applies to liquor from abroad as
well as to liquor from another state, and that it permits the application of a state license tax which the state court had held an exercise of police power as well as a fiscal measure
11. WHITE SLAvE ACT

The act of June 25, 1910, familiarly known as the white slave
act, forbids persons to transport or cause to be transported or to
induce any woman or girl to be transported in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or other immoral purposes. The constitutionality of the statute was sustained in Hoke v. United States,' as against the objections that it
abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, is not a regulation of interstate commerce .and is therefore
an encroachment on the reserved powers of the states and of the
people. Mr. Justice McKenna declared"that the power of Congress
under the commerce clause "is the ultimate determining question,"
since, "if the statute be a valid exercise of that power, how it
1(1912) 223 U. S. 70, 56 L. Ed. 355, 32 S. C. R. i8g. See io Mich. L.
Rev. 492. The question of "arrival" within a state is dealt with also in

61 U. Pa. L. Rev. 206.

"(0913) 227 U. S. io8, 57 L. Ed. 441, 33 S. C. R. 239. See 26 Harv. L.
Rev. 533, 554.
'The Wilson Act was followed by the Webb-Kenyon Act which forbade the interstate transportation of liquor to points in a state in which
its sale, etc., is forbidden by state law. Discussions of this statute
prior to the Supreme Court decision sustaining it will be found in Winfred
T. Denison, "Staites' Rights and the Webb-Kenyon Law," 14 Colum. L.
Rev. 320; Allen H. Kerr, "The Webb Act," 22 Yale L. J. 567; Lindsay
Rogers, "The Constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Bill," I Calif. L. Rev.
499; and notes in 14 Colum. L. Rev. 330, 348, 350, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 763,
and 12 Mich. L. Rev. 584.
"'(I913) 227 U. S. 308, 57 L. Ed. 523, 33 S. C. R. 281. See 26 Harv.

L. Rev. 657.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

may affect persons or states is not material to be considered." Commerce, he says, includes the transportations of persons, and it
is not material that women are not articles of commerce. The fact
that the motives of the transportation determine its lawful or unlawful character under the statute does not deprive the act of its
constitutional quality as a regulation of interstate commerce. "Motives executed by actions may make it the concern of government
to exert its powers." The contention that the act was a subterfuge and an attempt to interfere with the police powers of the
states was answered by saying that the means used by Congress
in the exercise of its powers may have the quality of police regulations and by referring to the prohibition of the interstate transportation of obscene literature and articles designed for indecent
and immoral use, of lottery tickets and of impure food and drugs.
After saying that "in all of these instances a clash of national
legislation with the powers of the states was urged, and in all rejected," Mr. Justice McKenna goes on:
"Our dual form of government has its perplexities, state and
nation having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said;
but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the nation are
adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently,
to promote the general welfare, material and moral; and surely,
if the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from
the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity
of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the
systematic enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and
debauchery of women, and, more insistently, of girls."
The Hoke Case was followed in Athanasaw v. United States,"
Bennett v. United States" and Harris v. United States" decided
at the same time. Wilson v. United States9 added that the commerce power extends to transportation by others than common
carriers and that the act applies when the unlawful purpose exists
at the time of the transportation and that subsequent abandonment of evil intention can not defeat prosecution under the act."
"(913)

227

U. S. 308, 322, 57 L. Ed. 523, 33 S. C. R. 281.
L. Ed. 528, 33 S. C. R. 285.

(1913) 227 U. S. 326, 57

T(I913) 227 U. S. 333, 57 L. Ed. 531, 33 S. C. R. 288.
'(3914) 227 U. S. 340, 57 L. Ed. 534, 33 S. C. R. 289.
"(1914) 232 U. S. 563, 58 L. Ed. 728, 34 S. C. R. 347. See 14 Colum.
L. Rev. 429, 450.
'In 21 Yale L. J. 94 is a note on a decision on the white slave act prior
to the Supreme Court decision, and in 12 Mich. L. Rev. 156 a discussion
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12. SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT

The anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, states that "every contract,
combination, in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with
foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal." Provision is made
for the punishment of violators of this section and also of "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize" etc.,
"any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or
with foreign nations." The constitutional issues raised by the enforcement of these provisions are whether the trade or commerce
involved is interstate or only intra-state and whether the application of the prohibitions to any given state of facts results in a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. Both
of these issues were raised in Standard Oil Co. v. United States"
and decided in favor of the government. The commerce question
was not discussed as the contention that the decree went beyond
interstate commerce and dealt with "mere questions of production of commodities within the states" was declared to be foreclosed by previous decisions. The defendants bought and sold
in different states from those in which they manufactured.
With respect to the due-process complaint, Chief Justice White
said in part:
"Many arguments are pressed in various forms of statement
which in substance amount to contending that the statute cannot
be applied under the facts of this case without impairing rights
of property and destroying the freedom of contract or trade
which is essentially necessary to the well-being of society, and
which, it is insisted, is protected by the constitutional guaranty
of due process of law. But the ultimate foundation of all these
arguments is the assumption that reason may not be resorted
to in interpreting and applying the statute, and therefore that
of a case in the federal district court holding that the act of Congress is
applicable to transportation for the forbidden object though the undertaking
is without pecuniary elements.
' 1 (IgII) 221 U. S. I, 55 L. Ed. 61g, 31 S. C. R. 5o2. See Andrew A.
Bruce, "The Supreme Court and the Standard Oil Case," 73 Cent. L. J.
iii ;Harold Evans, "The Standard Oil and American Tobacco Cases," 6o
U. Pa. L. Rev. 3II; Felix H. Levy, "The Federal Anti-trust Law and
the 'Rule of Reason,'" i Va. L. Rev. 188; Herbert Noble, "The Standard
Oil Case," 44 Amer. L. Rev. i; Robert L. Raymond, "The Standard Oil
and Tobacco Cases," 25 Harv. L. Rev. 3i; Albert H. Walker, "The 'Unreasonable' Obiter Dicta of Chief Justice White in the Standard Oil Case,"
72 Cent. L. J. 423, and "Review of the Opinions of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases," 45 Amer. L.
Rev. 718, 73 Cent. L. J. 21; H. L. Wilgus, "The Standard Oil Decision:
The Rule of Reason," 9 Mich. L. Rev. 643; and notes in 25 Harv. L. Rev.
71, 94, and 17 Va. L. Reg. i65. See also the references in note 26, infra.
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the statute unreasonably restricts the right to contract, and unreasonably operates upon the right to acquire and hold property.
As the premise is demonstrated to be unsound by the construction we have given the statute, of course the propositions which
rest upon that premise need not be further noticed."'
The construction of the act, here referred to, was that "restraint of trade" as used in the statute means only such restraint
of trade as was unlawful at common law, which in general was
"unreasonable," "undue" or "immoderate" restraint of trade.
Earlier decisions, as Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out in a separate
opinion, partly concurring and partly dissenting, had put a broader
interpretation upon the act and had held that "every contract in restraint of trade" means every contract that restrains trade
whether such restraint was lawful at common law or not. These
earlier decisions had held that this construction of the act did not
render it unconstitutional, so that it is not safe to assume that the
new affirmance of its constitutionality on the ground that it does
not go beyond the common law necessarily means that it would
thenceforth have been thought unconstitutional had the previous
interpretation continued to be accepted. Chief Justice White does
not concede that the interpretation of the statute has been altered.
He insists that its broad language necessarily requires the use of
reason in ascertaining its scope, that therefore the statute had always been interpreted reasonably, from which he assumes that the
term "restraint of trade" had previously been held to exclude
"reasonable" restraint of trade. Mr. Justice Harlan agrees that
the statute had always been interpreted reasonably and insists that
the reasonable interpretation previously given was that the court
could not insert before the words "restraint of trade" the qualifying adjectives "unreasofiable," "undue" or "immoderate." The
contrary position of the chief justice, when analyzed, will be seen
to consist of a pun on the"word "reasonable.""' This, however, had
to do, not with the proper interpretation of the statute as an
221 U. S. i, 69, 55 L. Ed. 61g, 31 S. C. R. 302.
'The dispute as to the meaning of the statute, is whether it forbids all
restraint of trade or only that unreasonable restraint of trade which was
'(1911)

forbidden by the common law. Previously, as Mr. Justice Harlan points
out, all the members of the court had concurred in declaring that "it has
been decided that not only unreasonble but all direct restraints of trade
are prohibited, the law being thereby distinguished from the common law."
These earlier decisions here referred to had not been unanimous, but in
one of them the majority, as quoted by Mr. Justice Harlan had declared:

"By the simple use of the term 'contract in restraint of trade', all contracts
of that nature, whether valid or otherwise would be included, and not
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original question, but with the issue whether the present interpretation is consistent with earlier ones.
A further constitutional contention in the case was that the
statute is so indefinite that it necessarily delegates legislative
power to the judiciary. Chief Justice White answers this by
saying:
"The statute certainly generically enumerates the character
of acts which it prohibits and the wrong which it was intended
to prevent. The propositions therefore insist that, consistently
with the fundamental principles of due process of law, it never
can be left to the judiciary to decide whether, in a given case, paiticular acts come within a generic statutory provision. But to
reduce the propositions, however, to- this, their final meaning,
makes it clear that in substance they' deny the existence of essential legislative authority, and challenge the right of the judiciary to perform duties which that department of the government
has exerted from the beginning. This is so clear as to require
no elaboration. Yet, let us demonstrate that which needs no
demonstration, by a few obvious examples. Take, for instance,
the familiar cases where the judiciary is called upon to determine
whether a particular act or acts are within a given prohibition,
depending upon wrongful intent. Take questions of fraud. Consider the power which must be exercised in every case where the
courts are called upon to determine whether particular acts are
invalid which are, abstractly speaking, in and of themselves valid, but which are asserted to be invalid because of their direct effect upon interstate commerce.".'
Two weeks later in United States v. American Tobacco Co.
the court reiterated the interpretation of "restraint of trade"
reached in the Standard Oil Case, though here as there the combialone that kind of contract which was invalid and unenforceable as
being in unreasonable restraint of trade. When, therefore, the body

of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in restraint

of trade or commerce among the several states. etc., the plain and

ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of contract
alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are
included in such language, and no exception or limitation can be added
without placing in the act that which has been omitted by Congress."
The pun by which Chief Justice White seeks to escape from these
earlier declarations consists in using the word "reasonable" now in the
sense of, "moderate" and now in the sense of "reached through a process
of reasoning."

To this is added the introduction of a negative.

Thus

we are told in effect that the court had necessarily used its reason in
interpreting "restraint of trade" and had thereby given that term a
meaning which was "reasonable," not only in the sense of "sensible" or
"reached by reasoning," but also in the sense of "unreasonable," "undue"

or "immoderate."
"4 (I91)
221 U. S. i, 69-70, 55 L. Ed. 61g, 31 S. C. R. 502.
'(i911)
221 U. S. io6, 55 L. Ed. 663, 31 S. C. R. 632. See 17 Va. L.
Reg. 24o, and discussion referred to in note 21, supra, and note 26, infra.
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nations in question were held to restrain trade unreasonably and
immoderately so that it was unnecessary to determine whether the
statute included or excluded reasonable or moderate restraint of
trade in or from its prohibitions. Chief Justice White again wrote
the opinion, and Mr. Justice Harlan repeated the objections he had
advanced in the Standard Oil Case. A contention that "the subject-matter of the combination" and "the combination itself, are
not within the scope of the anti-trust law, because, when rightly
considered, they are merely matters of intra-state commerce" was
left without specific refutation "because the want of merit in all
the arguments advanced on such subjects is so completely established by the prior decisions of this court, as pointed out in the
Standard Oil Case, as not to require restatement." Here as there
the defendants bought and sold in different states from those in
which they manufactured."
Somewhat more specific consideration was given to the commerce question in a number of other cases. Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co. v. United States," frequently called The Bathtub Case,
dissolved a combination of manufacturers and jobbers of enameled iron ware which through restrictions in license agreements
with respect to patented articles, restricted output, regulated prices,
and confined sales to those in the combination. One of the members of the combination contended that it was not engaged in interstate commerce, but Mr. Justice McKenna answered:
"It appears from the testimony that the company was. a man'The issues involved in the Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases and

other decisions interpreting the Sherman Law are considered in Charles
A. Boston, "The Spirit Behind the Sherman Anti-Trust Law," 21 Yale
L. J. 34I; Stuart Chevalier, "Has the Sugar Trust Case Been Overruled?,"
44 Amer. L. Rev. 858; Frederick H. Cooke, "The Need and Proper Scope
of Federal Legislation Against Restrictions Upon Conpetition," 46 Amer.
L. Rev. 676; Harold Evans, "The Supreme Court and the Sherman Act,"
59 U. Pa. L. Rev. 61; Roland R. Foulke, "Restraints on Trade," 12 Colum.
L. Rev. 97, 22o, and "The Federal Anti-Trust Act of i89o," 62 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 73, 161, 241; William B. Hornblower, "Anti-Trust Legislation
and Litigation," ii Colum. L. Rev. 7o; M. S. Hottenstein, "The Sherman
Anti-Trust Law," 44 Amer. L. Rev. 827; Charles P. Howland, "Monopolies: The Cause and the Remedy," 1o Colum. L. Rev. 91; Victor Morawetz, "The Supreme Court and the Anti-Trust Act," IO Colum. L. Rev.
687; Herbert Noble, "The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Industrial Combinations," 44 Amer. L. Rev. 177; Herbert Pope, "The Reason for the
L. Re%. 201; and
Continued Uncertainty of the Sherman Act," 7 Ill.
George W. Wickersham, "Recent Interpretation of the Sherman Act,"
io Mich. L. Rev. i.
2(1912) 226 U. S.20, 57 L. Ed. 107, 33 S.C. R. 9. See 26 Harv. L.
Rev. 275 and ii Mich. L. Rev. 386. The decision in the court below is
considered in 25 Harv.L. Rev. 454, 479.
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ufacturer and a jobber, manufacturing about one half of what it
sold. As a jobber it bought goods from other manufacturers, but
it denies there was an agreement as to prices with such manufacturers.
"The testimony as to the state or interstate character of its
business is that it manufactures at Elizabeth, New Jersey, and
buys also from other manufacturers and jobbers. It ships from
there to its warehouses in New York, Worcester, Massachusetts,
and Brooklyn. The trade of its Worcester branch covers about
200 miles around Worcester, its efforts being to localize its
business. It is doubtful, it is testified, if the trade goes beyond
Massachusetts, the trade there being circumscribed. Sales in Connecticut are made through the New York office from the warerooms.
"It is manifest that the Colwell Company was a party to the
combination and was also engaged in interstate commerce. The
fact that its trade was less general than that of the other manufacturers and jobbers does not take from it the character of
an interstate trader."'
The contract and combination held to offend against the Sherman Law in United States v. Reading Co.! was participated in by
'(1912)
226 U. S. 20, 50-5I, 57 L. Ed. 107, 33 S. C. R. 9. Two important cases interpreting the patent statute have a bearing on the scope
of the Sherman Law, since restraints of trade imposed as part of the
monopoly of a patentee are held not to violate the Sherman Law. Bauer
& Cie. v. O'Donnell, (1913) 229 U. S. I, 57 L. Ed. 1041, 33 S. C. R. 616,
often referred to as the Sanatogen Case, held that the monopoly of the
patentee does not include the right to limit by notice the resale price
of articles protected by the patent. This case is reviewed editorially in
2 Calif. L. Rev. 8o, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 632, 652, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 73, 96,
12 Mich. L. Rev. 394.

Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., (1912) 224 U. S. I, 56

L. Ed. 645, 32 S. C. R. 365, held that the monopoly of the-patentee includes
the power to limit by license restriction the use of the patented article in
conjunction with other articles not patented. For editorial notes on
this case see 12 Colum. L. Rev. 445, 471, 564, io Mich. L. Rev. 579, and
17 Va. L. Reg. 958. The relation between the patent law and the Sherman
Act is considered, Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., "Patents and the Sherman Act,"
12 Colum. L. Rev. 709; Walter H. Chamberlin, "Patented Articles: When
Are They Emancipated from the Patent Monopoly Under Which They
Are Manufactured?," 6 Ill. L. Rev. 357; Frank J. Hagan, "The Patent
Monopoly," i Georgetown L. J. 23; Gilbert H. Montague, "The Sherman
Anti-Trust Law and the Patent Law," 21 Yale L. J. 438, "The Supreme
Court on Patents," 21 Yale L. J. 583, and "The Proposed Patent Law
Revision," 26 Harv. L. Rev. 128; Edward S. Rogers, "Restrictions on
the Use of Patented Articles," io Mich. L. Rev. 608, and "Predatory Price
Cutting as Unfair Trade," 27 Harv. L. Rev. 139; and H. A. Toumlin, Jr.,
"The Patent Law and the Sherman Law," I Va. L. Rev. 445. See also
citations and references in notes 40 and 41 infra. The case of Henry
v. A. B. Dick Co. was later overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., (1917) 243 U. S. 502, 61 L. Ed. 871, 37 S. C. R.
416.
2 (I912) 226 U. S. 324, 57 L. Ed. 243, 33 S. C. R. go. See 26
Harv. L.
Rev. 379.
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interstate carriers who through an intermediary acquired coal
properties which were the only possible feeders of a proposed, independent interstate road, thereby preventing the construction of
such road. Further acts complained of by the government were
contracts with independent coal operators for the sale of the entire output of their mines. On the commerce question Mr. Justice
Lurton said:
"The coal contracts acquired when this proceeding was begun
aggregated nearly one-half the tonnage of the independent operators. Much of the coal so bought was sold in Pennsylvania,
and all of the contracts were made in that state, and the coal was
also there delivered to the buying defendants. That the defendants were free to sell again in Pennsylvania, or transport and
sell beyond the state, is true. That some of the coal was intended
for local consumption may also be true. But the general market
contemplated was the market at tide water, and the sales were
made on the basis of the average price at tide water. The mere
fact that the sales and deliveries took place in Pennsylvania is
not controlling when, as here, the expectation was that the coal
would, for the most part, fall into and become a part of the wellknown current of commerce between the mines and the general
consuming markets of other states. 'Commerce among the states
is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn
from the course of business'

. .

. The purchase and delivery

within the state was but one step in a plan and purpose to control
and dominate trade and commerce in other states for an illegal
purpose . . .
The concerted plan concerned the relations of these railroads
to their interstate commerce, and directly affected the transportation and sale and price of the coal in other states. The prime
object in engaging in this scheme was not so much the control and
sale of coal in Pennsylvania, but the control of sales at New
York harbor.""
A "corner" in cotton was held to violate the Sherman Law in
United States v. Patten," in which Mr. Justice Van Devanter
declared:
'(1912)
226 U. S. 324, 368, 57 L. Ed. 243, 33 S. C. R. go. The question who may sue for treble damages under the Sherman Law is con-

sidered in ii Colum. L. Rev. 481; the right of a minority stockholder, in
13 Colum. L. Rev. 154, 165; the right of a private person to enjoin violations of the 'Sherman Law, in 26 Harv. L. Rev. 179; the question
whether contracts with regard to producing grand opera are interstate in
character, in 14 Colum. L. Rev. 87; the district court decision in the
Harvester Trust Case, in 14 Colum. L. Rev. 658, 69o; and the question
whether a purchaser of goods can resist payment on the ground that the
seller is a violator of the Sherman Act, in 61 U. Pa. L. Rev. 201.
"(1913) 226 U. S.525, 57 L. Ed. 333, 33 S. C. R. 141. See 26 Harv. L.
Rev. 46z.

FEDERAL POWER OVER COMMERCE

"Of course, the statute does not apply where the trade or
commerce affected is purely intra-state. Neither does it apply,
as this court often has held, where the trade or commerce affected is interstate, unless the effect thereon is direct, not merely
indirect. But no difficulty is encountered in applying these tests
to the present case when its salient features are kept in view.
"It was a conspiracy to run a corner in the market. The commodity to be cornered was cotton-a product of the Southern
states, largely used and consumed in the Noithern states. It was
a subject of interstate trade and commerce, and through that
channel it was obtained from time to time by the many manufacturers of cotton fabrics in the Northern states. The comer
was to be conducted on the Cotton Exchange in New York city,
but by means which would enable the conspirators to obtain control of the available supply and to enhance the price to all buyers
in every market of the country. This control and the enhancement of the price were features of the conspiracy upon the attainment of which it is conceded its success depended. Upon the
corner becoming effective, there could be no trading in the commodity save at the will of the conspirators and at such price as
their interests might prompt them to exact. And so, the -conspiracy was to reach and to bring within its dominating influence
the entire cotton trade of the country.
"Bearing in mind that such was the nature, object, and scope
of the conspiracy, we regard it as altogether plain that, by its
necessary operation, it would directly and materially impede, and
burden the due course of trade and commerce among the states,
and therefore inflict upon the public the injuries which the antitrust act is designed to prevent . . .
"The defendants place some reliance upon Ware zr. Mobile
County, 209 U. S. 405, as showing that the operation of the conspiracy did not involve interstate trade or commerce; but we think
the case does not go so far and is not in point. It presented only
the question of the effect upon interstate trade or commerce of the
taxing by a state of the business of a broker who was dealing in
contracts for the future delivery of cotton, where there was no
obligation to ship from one state to another; while here we are
concerned with a conspiracy which was to reach and bring within
its dominating influence the entire cotton trade of the country, and
which was to be executed, in part only, through contracts for future delivery. It hardly needs statement that the character and
effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it and
viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole....
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented on some ground not specified,
and Mr. Justice Lurton and Chief Justice White dissented on the
ground that the court below interpreted the count in question as
failing to charge a "corner."
"(I913) 226

U. S. 525,

542-544, 57

L. Ed. 333, 33 S. C. R.

141.
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A contention that a prosecution for violating the Sherman Law
sought to punish acts beyond the boundaries of the United
States and therefore beyond the power of Congress was held unfounded in United States v. Pacific & A. R. & N. Co.' This involved an attempt by railway and steamship carriers, operating between Puget Sound and Yukon River points and passing through
Canada, to exclude competing carriers by refusing to establish
joint rates with them and by charging them the higher local rates.
The charge of extraterritoriality is thus disposed of by Mr. Justice
McKenna:
"The next contention of defendants is that, as part of the
transportation route was outside of the United States, the antitrust law does not apply. The consequences and, indeed, legal impossibility, are set forth to such application, and, it is said, 'make
it obvious that our laws relating to interstate and foreign commerce were not intended to have any effect upon the carriage by
foreign roads in foreign countries, and . . . it is equally clear that

our laws cannot be extended so as to control or affect the foreign
carriage.' This is but saying that laws have no extraterritorial
operation; but to apply the proposition as defendants apply it
would put the transportation route described in the indictment out
of the control of either Canada or the United States. These consequences we cannot accept. The indictment alleges that the four
companies which constitute the White Pass & Yukon Route (referred to as, the railroad), and owned and controlled by the same
persons, entered into the combination and conspiracy alleged, with
the intention alleged, with the Wharves Company and the defendant steamship companies. In other words, it was a control to be
exercised over transportation in the United States, and, so far, is
within the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States, criminal
and civil. If we may not control foreign citizens or corporations
operating in foreign territory, we certainly may control such citizens and corporations operating in our territory, as we undoubtedly may control our own citizens and our own corporations."'
A defendant prosecuted criminally for a violation of the antitrust act urged in Nash v. United States' that the indefiniteness
of the statute makes its criminal enforcement unconstitutional
because it leaves the defendant uninformed of the nature of his
crime. To this Mr. Justice Holmes answered:
" (1913) 228 U. S. 87, 57 L. Ed. 742, 33 S. C. R. 443.

"Ibid., o5-io6. A question similar to that raised in the Pacific Case
is considered in Warren B. Hunting, "Extra-territorial Effect of the
Sherman Law: Am. Banana Co. versus U. S. Fruit Co.," 6 Ill. L. Rev. 34.
8(1913) 229 U. S. 373, 57 L. Ed. 1232, 33 S. C. R. 780. Mr. Justice
Pitney dissents. Another case on the same question is considered in 13
Colum. L. Rev. 42r, 437.
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"But, apart from the common law as to the restraint of trade
thus taken up by the statute, the law is full of instances where a
man's fate depends upon his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or short imprisonment, as here; he may incur the penalty of death. 'An act causing
death may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure, according
to the degree of danger attending it' by common experience in
the circumstances known to the actor. 'The very meaning of
the fiction of implied malice in such cases at common law was,
that a man might have to answer with his life for consequences
which he neither intended nor foresaw.' . .'The criterion in such
cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the
circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct.'...
If a man should kill another by driving an automobile furiously
into a crowd, he might be convicted of murder however little he expected the result. . .If he did no more than drive negligently
through a street, he might get off with manslaughter or less ...
And in the last case he might be held though he himself thought
that he was acting as a prudent man should. .. We are of opinion that there is no. constitutional difficulty in the way of enforcing the criminal part of the act.'"
Cases in which defendants are held to have violated the Sherman Act involve the assumption that the commerce restrained
is interstate, even though there is no specific contest on the point.
The act was applied to the purchase by one interstate carrier of a
controlling interest in the stock of another in United States v. Union Pacific R. Co..' to a combination of the terminal facilities of
interstate railroads in United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, ' to an effort by retail lumber dealers in various states to
blacklist wholesalers who sold directly to consumers in Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States; to a combination of book publishers and book sellers to boycott others who
departed from the prices fixed for the sale of books in Straus v.
American Publishers' Ass'n;"' and to contracts between a manu"(1913) 229 U. S. 373, 377-378, 57 L. Ed. 1232, 33 S.C. R. 780. United
States v. Kissel, (191o) 218 U. S. 6ol, 54 L. Ed. 1168, 31 S. C. R. 124,
which holds that a conspiracy to violate the Sherman Law continues so
long as any further action is taken in furtherance of it, is commented on
in 1i Colum. L. Rev. 183 and 24 Harv. L. Rev. 5o5. A similar case is
treated in 26 Harv. L. Rev. 762.
"T(1912) 226 U. S. 61, 57 L. Ed. I24, 33 S.C. R. 53. See 26 Harv. L.
Rev. 379.
"(I912) 224 U. S.383, 56 L. Ed. 8io, 32 S. C. R. 507. See 25 Harv.
L. Rev. 717, 743.
0(1914) 234 U. S. 6oo, 58 L. Ed. 1490, 34 S. C. R. 951.

L. Rev. 493.

See 27 Harv.
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facturer and dealers in different states to maintain retail prices in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co."1
II.

COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS

Notwithstanding recurring expressions in Supreme Court
opinions that the power over interstate commerce is as broad as that
over foreign commerce, it is likely that there are differences between the two. Congress can certainly apply to foreign commerce
any regulation that is valid when imposed on commerce between
the states, but the converse is less clear. It is asserted that the
power over foreign commerce is absolute, while the largest adjectives applied to the power over interstate commerce are "complete"
and "plenary." The difference may be due, not to conceptions of
the meaning of the.commerce clause separately considered, but to
notions of differences in the applications of the due-process clause
of the fifth amendment to foreign and to interstate commerce
respectively, and of similar differences in the bearing of the reservations to the states contained in the ninth and tenth amendments.
At any rate, whitever the explanation, it is fairly certain that the

" (1913)

U. S. 222, 58 L. Ed. 192, 34 S. C. R. 84. See 14 Colum.
12 Mich. L. Rev. 507.
"(1911)
220 U. S. 373, 55 L. Ed. 502, 31 S. C. R. 376.
See William
J. Shroder, "Price Restriction on the Resale of Chattels," 25 Harv. L.
Rev. 59; Archibald H. Taylow, "Is Competition Compassed by Immorality, That Sort of Unrestricted Trade Which is Favored of the Law?
Dr. Miles 'Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 273,"
46 Amer. L. Rev. 184; and notes in 24 Harv. L. Rev. 68o, 6o U. Pa. L.
Rev. 270, and 17 Va. L. Reg. I61. See also references in note 28, supra.
Other notes on retail price fixing appear in 13 Colum. L. Rev. 445 and 59
U. Pa. L. Rev. 187.
Two cases in which the acts in question were held to constitute no
offense againt the Sherman Law give no indication that the trade involved was not interstate. Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., (1913)
227 U. S. 8, 57 L. Ed. 393, 33 S. C. R. 2o2, allowed a corporation selling
patented articles in states other than the state of manufacture to make
another corporation its exclusive sales agent and to restrict it to fixed
prices. In United States v. Winslow, (913) 227 U. S. 202, 57 L. Ed. 481,
33 S. C. R. 253, the union into one corporation of three corporations selling
different patented articles which did not compete with one another was
held not an unlawful restraint of trade.
For articles dealing more or less directly with questions of federal
power over commerce, see 'Wm. Houston Kenyon, "The Kahn Act: A
Criticism", 14 Colum. L. Rev. 52; Carman F. Randolph, "The Inquisitorial Power Conferred by the Trade Commission Bill," 23 Yale L. J. 672;
Fitz-Henry Smith, Jr., "The New Federal Statute Relating to Liens on
Vessels," 24 Harv. L. Rev. 182; Charles E. Townsend, "The Protection
of Intellectual Property at International Expositions," 2 Calif. L. Rev.
291; and Harold F. White, "Legal Aspects of the Panama Canal," 8 Ill.
L. Rev. 442.
231

L. Rev. 163 and
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power of Congress over foreign commerce is more arbitrary and
more nearly absolute than that over interstate commerce. It is
well, therefore, to group in a separate section two cases sustaining regulations of foreign commerce which may be influenced by
considerations not applicable to the same extent to commerce
among the several states.
By the act of June 20, 1906, Congress made it unlawful to land
or offer for sale at any port or place in the United States any
sponges taken by means of diving or diving apparatus from the
waters of the Gulf of Mexico or Straits of Florida, with an exception in favor of sponges over four inches in diameter which
had been gathered between October 1st and May 1st in water
over fifty feet deep. The constitutionality of the statute came
before the court in The Abby Dodge" which was a libel of a vessel
charged with bringing into a port in Florida a cargo of sponges
unlawfully taken "from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and
the Straits of Florida." Chief Justice White conceded that "the
statute is repugnant to the constitution when applied to spongetaken or gathered within, state territorial limits," apparently without making any distinction between sponges landed in the state
from which they were taken and those landed in other states. To
avoid the necessity of holding the act unconstitutional he construed it as not applying to sponges taken in local waters and gent the
case back with permission to the government, if it desired, "to
amend the libel so as to present a case within the statute as construed." In affirming the constitutionality of the act when applied
only to foreign commerce, he said:
"Undoubtedly (Lord z. Goodall, N. & P. S. Co., 102 U. S.
541), whether the Abby Dodge was a vessel of the United States
or of a foreign nation, even although it be conceded that she was
solely engaged in taking or gathering- sponges in the waters which,
by the law of nations, would be regarded as the common property
of all, and was transporting the sponges so gathered to the United
States, the vessel was engaged in foreign commerce, and was
therefore amenable to the regulating power of Congress
over that subject.
This being not open to discussion,
the want of merit of the contention is shown, since
the practices from the beginning, sanctioned by the decisions
of this court, establish that Congress, by an exertion of its'power
to regulate foreign commerce, has the authority to forbid merchandise carried in such commerce from entering the United
states. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 492, 493, and
'Note 8, supra.
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authorities there collected. Indeed, as pointed out in the Buttfield Case, so complete is the authority of Congress over the subject that no one can be said to have a vested right to carry on foreign commerce with the United States." 3
This avoids specific refutation of the contention of extra-territoriality made in the objection that the act applies to "sponges
taken from the bed of the ocean, which the national government
has no power to deal with.""
A similar contention of extra-territoriality was advanced in

United States v. Nord Deutscher Lloyd"3 which sustained an indictment for violating a federal prohibition against making any charge
for the return of aliens unlawfully brought into the United States
or taking security therefor. The defendant steamship company had
required emigrants sailing from Germany to buy return tickets
223 U. S. 166, 176-177, 56 L. Ed. 390, 32 S. C. R. 3io.
"Another power by which Congress may deal with matters which
occur in the bailiwick of Neptune is that of passing necessary and proper
laws to carry into effect the jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime
matters vested in the federal courts. An exercise of this power appears
in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, (1914) 233 U. S. 718, 58 L.
Ed. 1171, 34 S. C. R. 744, which holds that the Act of Congress permitting ship owners to limit liability applies to loss caused by a foreign ship
on the high seas when suit therefor is brought in the federal courts. The
loss in question was caused by the sinking of the Titanic after its collision
with an iceberg. In support of the application of the American statute
to suitsein the American federal courts, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"It is true that the act of Congress does .not control or profess to control the conduct of a British ship on the high seas. . . . It is true that
the foundation for a recovery upon a British tort is an obligation created
by British law. But it also is true that the laws of the forum may decline
altogether to enforce that obligation on the ground that it is contrary to
the domestic policy, or may decline to enforce it except within such limits
as it may impose. . . . It is competent, therefore, to Congress to
enact that, in certain matters belonging to admiralty jurisdiction, parties
resorting to our courts shall recover only to such extent or in such way
as it may mark out. . . . The question is not whether the owner of
the Titantic by this proceeding can require all claimants to come in, and
can cut down rights vested under English law, as against, for instance,
Englishmen living in England, who do not appear. It is only whether
those who do see fitto sue in this country are limited in their recovery
irrespective of the English law. That they are so limited results, in our
opinion, from the decisions of this court." (pages 732-733). Mr. Justice
McKenna dissented, thinking that a previous decision had implied that the
law of the ship should govern the amount of recovery. For a note on the
case, see 63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 133. The decision in the court below is considered in Joseph I. Kelly, "The 'Titanic' Death Liability," 7 Ill. L. Rev.
138; and notes in 14 Colum. L. Rev. 445, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 82, and 62 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 547.
For an instance of the application of the federal statute permitting
limitation of liability to a suit against a shipowner for a nonmaritime tort,
see Richardson v. Harmon, (1911) 222 U. S. 96, 56 L. Ed. 110, 32 S. C. R.
"(1912)

27.

"5(1912) 223

U. 5.

512,

56 L. Ed.

531, 32

5. C. R.

244.
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there. To its objection that what was lawfully done in Germany
could not be punished as a crime in New York, Mr. Justice Lamar
replied:
"The statute of course has no extra-territorial operation, and
the defendant cannot be indicted here for what he did in a foreign
country. . . But the parties in Germany could make a contract
which would be in force in the United States. When, therefore,
in Bremen the alien paid and the defendant received the 150 roubles for a return passage, they created a condition which was operative in New York. If, in that city, the company had refused
to honor the ticket, the alien could there have enforced his rights.
In like manner, if by reason of facts occurring in New York the
statute operated to rescind the contract, the rights and duties of the
parties could there be determined, and acts of commission or
omission, which were there unlawful, could there be punished.
"If, as argued, the company did nothing in New York except
to retain money which had been lawfully paid in Germany, the
result is not different, because, under the circumstances, nonaction
was equivalent to action. The indictment charges that on December 16, 1910, it was found that the aliens had been unlawfully
brought into this country. The company at once was under the
duty of taking them back at its own cost. Instead of returning
to them the money previously received for such transportation, the
defendant retained it up to the date of the indictment, April 3, 1911,
with intent to make charge and secure payment for their passage
to Bremen. This retention of the money, with such intent, was
an affirmative violation of the statute. The company could not
take the aliens back free of charge, as required by law, and at the
same time retain the fare covering the same trip.""
" Ibid., 517-518. In the power of Congress to coin money was found
the sanction for an act of the Philippine legislature prohibiting the export
of silver coins which was sustained in Ling Su Fan v. United States,
(IgIO) 218 U. S. 302, 54 L. Ed. io49, 31 S. C. R. 21. In support of the
decision Mr. Justice Lurton declared:
"The power to 'coin money and regulate the value thereof, and of
foreign coin', is a prerogative of sovereignty and a power exclusively
vested in the Congress of the United States. The power which the government of the Philippine Islands has in respect to local coinage is derived from the express act of Congress. . .
"However unwise a law may be, aimed at the exportation of such
coins, in the face of the axioms against obstructing the free flow of commerce, there can be no serious doubt but that the power to coin money
includes the power to prevent its outflow from the country of its origin.
To justify the exercise of such a power it is only necessary that it shall
appear that the means are reasonably adapted to conserve the general
public interest, and are not an arbitrary interference with private rights
of contract or property. The law here in question is plainly within the
limits of the police power, and not an arbitrary or unreasonable interference with private rights. If a local coinage was demanded by the general
interest of the Philippine Islands, legislation reasonably adequate to
maintain such coinage at home as a medium of exchange is not a viola-
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While the power to deport aliens is not referable to the commerce clause alone, the exits and the entrances of persons from
and to the country necessarily involve foreign commerce, and
cases on such matters may appropriately be noted here. The procedure for deporting alien prostitutes was Austained in Low Wah
Suev v. Backus" as against the complaints that it denied due process of law because the alien was not entitled to counsel at her
first examination by the administrative authorities and because
the immigration officer had no power to compel the attendance of
witnesses. As a matter of statutory construction Lapina v. Williarns' held that the act of February 20, 1907, which provides for
the deportation of aliens found to be practicing prostitution within
three years of their arrival in the country, applies to acts within
three years of a second arrival, though prior to a return visit to her
home-land the lady in question had already resided three years in
the United States. Bagajewitz v. Adams" sustains the act of March
26, 1910, which strikes out the three year limitation in the act of
February 20, 1907. Miss Bugajewitz had been derelict after the
effective date of the second statute, and Mr. Justice Holmes observed that, as to her, "it is not necessary to construe the statute
as having any retrospective effect." He declared, however, that
the constitutional provision against ex post facto laws has no
application to deportation proceedings, since deportation is not a
punishment, but simply a refusal by the government to harbor
persons whom it does not want. "It is thoroughly established that
Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful."'
tion of private right, forbidden by the organic law. Obviously, if the
Philippine government had power to prohibit the exportation or melting
of Philippine silver pesos, it had power to make the violation of the prohibition a misdemeanor." (pages 310-311).
"(1912) 225 U. S. 460, 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. C. R. 734.
4(0914) 232 U. S. 78, 58 L. Ed. 515, 34 S. C. R. 196. See 14 Colum. L.
Rev. 345.
"(1913) 228 U. S. 585, 57 L. Ed. 978, 33 S. C. R. 607.
'United States v. Regan, (1914) 232 U. S. 37, 58 L. Ed. 494, 34 S. C. R.
213, commented on in 2 Georgetown L. J. 39, held that the violation of
the alien immigration act need not be established beyond a reasonable
doubt in an action of debt brought by the government to recover a penalty,
since the action is civil and not criminal.
A phase of the immigration problem is considered in Clement L.
Bouve, "The Immigration Act and Returning Aliens," 59 U. Pa. L. Rev.
359. In 13 Colum. L. Rev. 346 is a note on the exclusion of ex-President
Castro of Venezuela, in 9 Mich. L. Rev. 412 one on the power of the
governor general to expel resident aliens from the Philippine Islands, and
in 6o U. Pa. L. Rev. 279 one on the deportation of aliens after acquittal
of a criminal charge.

FEDERAL POWER OVER COMMERCE
III.

COMMERCE WITH THE INDIAN TRI3ES ,

Cases sustaining federal statutes prohibiting the sale of liquor
to the Indians are frequently referred both to the commerce
clause and to the more general powers of Congress as guardians of
1
the Indians. Thus in Perrin v. United States"
Mr. Justice Van
Devanter observed:
"The power of Congress to prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquors into an Indian reservation, wheresoever situated,
and to prohibit traffic in such liquors with tribal Indians, whether
upon or off a reservation and whether within or without the limits
of a state, does not admit of any doubt. It arises in part from the
clause in the constitution investing Congress with authority 'to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes, and in part from the recognized
relation of tribal Indians to the federal government."'
The principal case sustained an indictment for selling liquor on
lands formerly ceded to the United States by Indians but at the
time held in private ownership by non-Indians in a duly organized municipality of South Dakota. The defendant was not an
Indian and it did not appear whether the persons to whom he
sold were Indians or whites. The statute against which the sale
was an offense was passed by Congress as part of the act of ratifying a treaty with the Indians which provided that the ceded lands
should remain dry. It seems to be sustained, not under authority
to enforce the treaty or under the commerce clause, but rather as
a proper measure by a guardian to protect its ward. It is recognized that its propriety would evaporate as soon as it ceased to be
reasonably necessary for the protection of Indian wards in the
surrounding territory.
The same idea of the government's guardianship over the Indians underlies Johnson v. Gearlds," which sustains the application of a federal prohibitory law to land ceded by the Indians,
United States v. Sandoval,' which affirms a conviction for introducing liquor into Indian pueblos, Hallowell v. United States,'
which holds that a statute punishing the introduction of liquor
into Indian country applies to introduction into lands held by the
United States in trust for Indians though the liquor is brought
"(i9J4)

232 U. S. 478, 58 L. Ed. 691, 34 S. C. R. 387.

12 Ibid., 482.

'(1914) 234 U. S. 422, 58 L. Ed. 1383, 34 S. C. R. 794.
"(1913) 231 U. S. 28, 58 L. Ed. 107, 34 S. C. R. i. The decision in

the court below is discussed in 13 Colum. L. Rev. 74.
'(911) 221 U. S. 317, 55 L. Ed. 750, 31 S. C. R. 587.
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in for personal use by an Indian who has been naturalized as a
citizen, and Ex Parte Webb,' which relates to the introduction of
liquor from Missouri to certain "Indian country" in Oklahoma.
This last case is concerned mainly with the question whether Congress meant its laws still to apply. This question was answered
in the affirmative.'
In the course of the opinion Mr. Justice
Pitney declared:
"The power of Congress to regulate commerce between the states,
and with Indian tribes situated within the limits of a state, justifies
Congress when creating a new state out of a territory inhabited by
Indian tribes, and into which territory the introduction of intoxicating liquors is by existing laws and treaties prohibited, in so legislating as to preserve those laws and treaties in force to the extent
of excluding interstate traffic in intoxicating liquors that would
be inconsistent with the prohibition."'
Earlier in the opinion he had declared that the commerce power
of Congress extends to traffic with a member of an Indian tribe
although such traffic be within the limits of a state. It is wholly
academic whether the power over commerce with the Indian
tribes would alone sanction what is approved under a combination of the commerce clause and the guardianship theory, since
the combination may always be invoked. The limits of the commerce power can appear clearly only from cases in which some
regulation of traffic with Indians is held beyond the power of Congress.
S. C. R. 769.
contrary answer by a state court is considered in ii Colum. L.

" (I912) 225 U. S. 663, 56 L. Ed. 1248, 32

"The

Rev. 8i.

"(I912) 225 U. S. 663, 69i, 56 L. Ed. 1248, 32 S. C. R. 769.

